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The effect of the minimum wage on labour markets
has long been of interest to both economists and
policymakers. Debates about whether to enact a
minimum wage and whether to raise its level
repeatedly surface in political discussions through-
out the industrialised world, and economic experts
are often asked for their views on the potential
effects of proposed legislation in this area.
For many years, however, empirical research on
this topic was limited largely to the United States
and relied primarily on time-series variation to
identify the employment effects of an increase in
the minimum wage.After a number of US states in
the late 1980s raised their minimum wage levels
above the national minimum, researchers – recog-
nising the limitations of relying exclusively on
time-series evidence – began to examine the
employment differences associated with this
regional variation in wage floors. Interestingly, this
new strain of research led to a substantially wider
range of estimated employment effects than was
reported in the time-series literature, leading some
economists to question the consensus view that
minimum wages reduce employment among lower-
skilled workers.
Following on the results for the United States,
researchers have also exhibited a renewed interest
in reassessing the effects of minimum wages on
employment in European countries. To some
extent,this interest probably was stimulated by the
renewed debate over the size and direction of such
effects in the United States. In addition, however,
the increasing integration of European labour
markets associated with the expansion of the
European Community and the creation of the
European Monetary Union has drawn attention to
the potential impact of differing degrees of labour
market rigidities across countries – the minimum
wage being one possible source of such rigidities –
in the context of greater labour and capital mobil-
ity and a unified monetary policy.
Although minimum wages appeared, on average,
to reduce youth employment in industrialised
countries1, the estimated magnitude of job loss
often differed considerably across individual coun-
tries.This suggests the possibility that the effects of
minimum wages on employment might be influ-
enced by other aspects of the labour market that
differ across countries. Most obviously, other pro-
visions of the minimum wage laws themselves
might influence the disemployment effects associ-
ated with an increase in the level of the minimum
wage. But it is not difficult to think of other labour
market policies or institutions that might strength-
en or weaken minimum wage effects, including
those not formally related to the minimum wage.
Recent theoretical research also points to the pos-
sibility that seemingly disparate labour market
policies could interact in affecting employment.
For example,Coe and Snower (1997) show that the
effects of enacting a policy that reduces employ-
ment on average could be magnified or reduced
depending on the restrictiveness of the existing
labour market environment. In the context of min-
imum wages, their model predicts that the exis-
tence of stricter job security measures,more gener-
ous unemployment benefits and greater bargaining
strength among incumbent workers will tend to
exacerbate the negative employment effects of an
increase in the minimum wage, while policies
designed to increase rates of job creation will tend
to mitigate those effects.
On the empirical front, there has been a growing
body of literature that uses cross-country compar-
isons to investigate the effects of labour market poli-
cies. Among these are studies that examine the
effects of job security regulations on employment
and unemployment (Lazear 1990; OECD 1999; Di
Tella and MacCulloch,forthcoming),broader studies
of labour market rigidities and unemployment
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(Nickell 1997; Siebert 1997; Blanchard and Wolfers
2000), and studies of potential interactions among
labour market institutions (Belot and Van Ours
2001).2 Up until now, however, there has been little
research focusing specifically on interactions of the
minimum wage with other provisions of minimum
wage laws or with other labour market policies more
generally. Here, we review our recent research on
such interactions (Neumark and Wascher 2004) and
point to some implications of that research for youth
labour market policies.
A comparison of minimum wage laws across
countries
Table 1 shows some of the characteristics of mini-
mum wage laws in 20 major industrialised coun-
tries. Data are taken from the OECD for countries
in which a national minimum wage is set by statute
or by national collective bargaining agreement.For
countries in which no national minimum wage
exists, but in which industry- or occupation-specif-
ic minimums are set by legislation or collective
bargaining, the estimates are from Dolado et al.
(1996). The first column displays the ratio of the
minimum wage to the average wage for each coun-
try in 1976, while the second column shows this
ratio in 2000; the columns are ordered by the rela-
tive value of the wage floor in 2000.3 This ratio is
one of the standard indicators used to gauge the
“bite” of the minimum wage and is intended to
measure the extent to which the minimum cuts into
the wage distribution.
As can be seen in the second column, there is sub-
stantial variation in the bite of the minimum wage
across countries,with the level of the minimum wage
ranging from 71 percent of the average wage in Italy
to only 32 percent in Spain. As is often noted, the
higher minimum wage levels are almost universally
found in continental Europe; in fact,Australia is the
only non-European country with a minimum wage
ratio above 50 percent. In contrast, the other Anglo
Table 1
Minimum wages and other characteristics of minimum wage systems in selected countries
Ratio of minimum wage
to average wage
Other characteristics of
minimum wage systems (1993) Country
1976 2000 Method for setting Level Youth
subminimum
Italy (1991) 0.78 0.71 Negotiated Industry Some
Norway (1994) – 0.64 Negotiated Industry No
France 0.58 0.62 Statute National Limited, <18
Australia 0.65
a) 0.58 Statute National <21
Germany (1994) 0.60 0.58 Negotiated Industry Some
Ireland – 0.56 Labour Committees Industry <18
Denmark (1994) 0.59 0.54 Negotiated Industry <18
Finland (1993) – 0.52 Negotiated Industry,
region
No
Greece 0.69 0.51 Negotiated National No
Sweden (1992) 0.52 0.51 Negotiated Industry <24
Belgium 0.58 0.49 Negotiated National <21
Luxembourg 0.41 0.49 Statute National <18
Netherlands 0.64 0.47 Statute National <23
New Zealand 0.57 0.46 Statute National <20
Canada 0.52 0.43 Statute National,
provincial
No
United Kingdom 0.43 0.42 Wages Councils Industry <21
Portugal 0.48 0.38 Statute National <18
United States 0.47 0.36 Statute National,
State
Limited
Japan 0.29 0.33 Statute Prefecture No
Spain 0.48 0.32 Statute National <18
Notes: Minimum wage ratios are from the OECD minimum wage database and Dolado et al. (1996). The OECD
uses a median wage to calculate the ratios, while Dolado et al. use a mean wage. Other information is taken from
Table 2.1 in OECD (1998), Table 1 in Dolado et al., and from reports by the European Commission (1998) and the
United Kingdom Low Pay Commission (2001). Figures in parentheses refer to the year for which information on
minimum wages was available for countries for which we did not have data for 2000.
a) Figure refers to 1985.
2 See also the recent summaries in the CESifo DICE Report by
Kahn (2003), Belot and Van Ours (2003) and Nickell (2003).
3 Where information was not available for 2000, we have indicated
in parentheses the year for which we report this ratio.countries and Japan are toward the bottom of the
distribution, with minimum wage ratios typically at
about 45 percent or below in 2000.
A comparison of the first and second columns also
indicates that some countries saw substantial
changes in relative minimum wages between 1976
and 2000. Of the 17 countries for which figures are
available in both years, 14 experienced a reduction
in the minimum wage ratio, and only Luxembourg
saw a meaningful increase. Particularly notable are
the declines for The Netherlands, where the gov-
ernment implemented a cut in the nominal mini-
mum wage in 1984 and a freeze for the remainder
of the 1980s, and for Greece and Spain, where
nominal minimum wage increases significantly
lagged behind the overall pace of wage growth.
Also, although not shown in the table, the United
Kingdom abolished its system of Wages Councils in
August 1993 and did not introduce a national min-
imum wage until April 1999.
The remaining columns of the table summarise
some other provisions of the minimum wage sys-
tems in each country, which can differ across coun-
tries in important ways.4 We have identified three
particular areas for which specific aspects of mini-
mum wage policies might be expected to influence
the employment effects of a wage floor.The first of
these is the process by which minimum wages are
set.In some countries,minimum wage levels are set
by statute, while in others, they are the product of
a collective bargaining process involving unions,
employers and the national government.As can be
seen in the third column, except for France and
Australia, the countries with relatively high wage
ratios are those in which unions take an active role
in negotiating minimum wages. In contrast, coun-
tries with low minimum wage ratios tend to be
those where the wage floor is set by statute. If
unions and employers have better information
than legislators as to what constitutes a relevant
market wage for unskilled labour and use that
information in deciding on the appropriate level of
the minimum wage,then one might expect the min-
imum wage to have a smaller distortionary effect
on low-wage labour markets when unions actually
participate in setting the wage floor. On the other
hand, if the presence of unions in the negotiating
process tends to result in a higher minimum wage
than would otherwise be set,then countries using a
collective bargaining process might see larger dis-
employment effects than countries where mini-
mum wages are set by legislation.
In addition, there sometimes is significant varia-
tion in minimum wages across industries or geo-
graphic regions.As indicated in the fourth column,
such variation is more likely to be present in coun-
tries where the wage floor is determined through a
collective bargaining process. If such regional or
industry variation is a consequence of a process
that better targets minimum wage levels to sub-
groups of workers in particular industries or geo-
graphic regions, any disemployment effects would
tend to be smaller. However, if this variation rep-
resents a tendency by some regions or industries to
establish a high minimum wage without regard to
the relative productivity of the applicable sub-
group, then the adverse consequences of the mini-
mum wage in that country would be more severe.
Finally, as the last column shows, many countries
have lower minimum wage levels that apply to
workers who are younger than a specified age
level. Given that youths comprise a significant
share of the low-wage labour market, such provi-
sions would be expected to reduce the disemploy-
ment effects of minimum wages.
The effects of minimum wage laws on 
employment and unemployment
Table 2 shows the minimum wage ratios for each
country in 1986 and 2000, along with the employ-
ment rates and unemployment rates for youths
(ages 15 to 24) prevailing in each year.5 At first
glance, it is difficult to see an unambiguous pattern
in the table. Nevertheless, as indicated in the sec-
ond to last row, there is a negative correlation
across countries between the minimum wage ratio
and the youth employment rate in both 1986 and
2000, and a positive correlation between the mini-
mum wage ratio and the youth unemployment rate
CESifo DICE Report 2/2004 42
Research Reports
4 This information was collected from various OECD reports, a
report by the European Commission (1998), the UK Low Pay
Commission Report (2001), and the Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices from the US Department of State. Additional
detail on prevailing minimum wage laws in each country is
summarised in Neumark and Wascher (2004).
5 In our study, the employment rate is defined as the percent of the
youth population that is employed,while the unemployment rate is
the percent of the youth labour force without a job and looking for
work.Because it is often difficult to distinguish whether youths are
unemployed or out of the labour force altogether,we view our esti-
mates of the effect of minimum wages on youth employment rates
as being more relevant than its effect on unemployment rates.CESifo DICE Report 2/2004 43
Research Reports
in both years. Moreover, as shown by the correla-
tions in the last row and in Figures 1 and 2,changes
in the minimum wage are clearly negatively corre-
lated with changes in employment and positively
correlated with changes in unemployment for the
countries in the sample.
The result that higher minimum
wages contribute to lower
employment rates among youths
is confirmed in more formal
analyses that use time-series data
for each country from 1976 to
2000 and that control for other
factors likely to affect youth
employment, including business
cycles, demographic changes and
persistent country-specific factors
independent of aggregate labour
market conditions. As described
in Neumark and Wascher (2004),
these analyses suggest that, on
average, a ten percent increase in
the minimum wage is associated
with roughly a one percent to three percent decline
in the youth employment rate.This estimate is strik-
ingly similar to the magnitude of minimum wage
effects often reported for the United States.
However, our results also suggest that the size of
the disemployment effects associated with the min-
Table 2
Minimum wage levels and youth labour market conditions
Minimum wage ratio Employment rate Unemployment rate
Country
1986 2000 1986 2000 1986 2000
Italy 0.75 – 29.2 26.1 34.5 29.7
Norway –– 62.2 57.7 5.0 10.2
France 0.63 0.62 32.9 23.3  23.4 20.7
Australia 0.63 0.58 59.5 60.5  14.5 12.3
Germany 0.59 – 55.1 48.4 7.8 7.7
Ireland – 0.56 41.2 48.2 25.7 6.4
Denmark 0.62 – 69.1 67.1 8.1 6.7
Finland –– 53.6 39.8 10.1 21.6
Greece 0.59 0.51 29.5 26.9 24.2 29.5
Sweden 0.57 -- 61.7 46.1 6.8 11.9
Belgium 0.57 0.49 33.7 30.3 21.1 15.2
Luxembourg 0.46 0.49 54.4 31.8 6.2 6.4
Netherlands 0.56 0.47 39.8 68.4 20.0 6.6
New Zealand 0.47 0.46 67.0 54.7 7.8 13.2
Canada 0.39 0.42 58.9 56.3 14.8 12.6
United Kingdom 0.46 0.42 62.9 61.5 17.9 11.8
Portugal 0.47 0.38 51.3 41.9 18.5 8.6
United States 0.37 0.36 59.5 59.8 13.3 9.3
Japan 0.29 0.33 40.9 42.7 5.2 9.2
Spain 0.37 0.32 31.2 35.9 42.8 25.5
Correlation with mini-




––– – 0.46* – 0.50**
Notes: The employment rate is the percent of the youth population that is employed. The unemployment rate is the
percent of the youth labour force that is unemployed. Both rates refer to youths ages 15 to 24 (14–24 in Italy and
16–24 in the US, the UK, Sweden and Norway).
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
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Figure 1imum wage can be influenced by other characteris-
tics of minimum wage systems. In particular, coun-
tries in which the minimum wage is determined
through a collective bargaining process tend to
exhibit a smaller negative impact of an increase in
the minimum wage, perhaps because this process
helps to target a level of the minimum wage more
appropriate to prevailing labour market condi-
tions. In contrast, the presence of industry- or geo-
graphic-specific wage floors appears to increase
the employment losses associated with a higher
minimum wage,which might suggest that such vari-
ation is primarily used to raise the minimum wage
to levels where disemployment effects set in,rather
than to target minimum wages to relative produc-
tivity levels in particular industries or to living
costs in particular locations. Finally, countries with
a youth subminimum wage consistently show that
youths experience smaller job losses from the min-
imum wage than do countries without such provi-
sions, perhaps because the subminimum leads
employers to substitute lower-cost youths for low-
skilled adult workers who are subject to the full
minimum wage.
The sensitivity of minimum wage effects to other
labour market institutions
As noted in the introduction,economic theory pre-
dicts that the economic effects of minimum wages
may also be influenced by the presence of other
labour market institutions that are not directly
related to the minimum wage, but that interact
with it in ways that mitigate or exacerbate its dis-
tortionary effects on labour
markets. In this regard, we
examined whether the estimat-
ed employment losses associat-
ed with raising the minimum
wage differ according to the
particular types of labour mar-
ket policies or institutions pre-
sent in each country.
Table 3 presents information
on the types of policies and
institutions considered in our
analysis. In general, these insti-
tutional features of labour mar-
kets span a range of factors
often thought to influence
labour market flexibility,
including job security legislation, unemployment
benefits, job creation policies and workers’ bar-
gaining power.
The first column shows an index of labour stan-
dards,which is constructed from the OECD’s char-
acterisation of the strictness of legislated rules cov-
ering working time, flexible employment contracts
and workers’ representation rights.A high value of
this index – as in Sweden – indicates the presence
of substantial labour market rigidities in these
areas, whereas low values – as in the United States
– are suggestive of more flexibility.The second col-
umn shows an index of the strictness of employ-
ment protection regulations. This index, which is
also constructed from information collected by the
OECD, ranks countries according to the proce-
dures and severance pay requirements associated
with the dismissal of an employee. As in the first
column, a high value of the index indicates that the
country has a high degree of employment protec-
tion, while a low value indicates relative ease in
dismissing employees.
The third column of the table summarises the
extent to which governments in each country use
active labour market policies to assist unemployed
workers in obtaining a job; such policies could
include job search assistance, training programs,
employment subsidies for private job creation or
public job creation programs. The figures in the
table refer to the level of public expenditures on
such programs in 1995 as a percentage of that
country’s GDP, so that a higher value indicates
greater use of active policies in a particular coun-
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try. The fourth column of the table shows the per-
centage of wage and salary workers who are mem-
bers of a union (from Nickell and Nunziata 2001),
while the final column of the table presents a mea-
sure of the generosity of each country’s unemploy-
ment insurance system. This latter variable, which
is published by the OECD, is defined as the gross
level of unemployment benefits as a percent of
previous earnings.
The bottom row of the table summarises our esti-
mates of how these institutional features of labour
markets influence the disemployment effects of the
minimum wage. For each column, we indicate
whether the greater presence of a particular policy
or institution tends to strengthen the disemployment
effect of the minimum wage or weaken it. For exam-
ple, by themselves, more restrictive labour standards
tend to exacerbate the negative consequences of
raising the wage floor, which is consistent with the
idea that the presence of strict standards on the use
of hours and temporary contract workers forces
more of the adjustment to a higher minimum wage
to take place by way of a reduction in employment.
In contrast, stricter employment protection regula-
tions appear to weaken the disemployment effects of
minimum wages,presumably because it is more cost-
ly to dismiss workers in countries with such regula-
tions. Similarly, greater use of active labour market
policies also reduces the extent of job loss associated
with the minimum wage, likely because youths dis-
placed from private-sector jobs by a higher wage
floor are absorbed by government employment or
training programs. However, we would note in this
regard that the consequences of a higher minimum
wage may instead appear as an increase in govern-
ment budget deficits. Finally, greater bargaining
power among incumbent workers (as measured by
the degree of unionisation) appears to strengthen
the negative effects of the minimum wage on youth
employment, consistent with the view that unions
successfully shift the costs of the minimum wage
onto non-union workers, who are more likely to be
young. In contrast, the generosity of unemployment
insurance benefits appears to have little influence on
the size of job losses associated with the minimum
wage,despite evidence that they reduce employment
levels more generally.
Table 3











Italy 3 14.25 0.93 43.0 7.3
Norway 4   9.75 1.35 54.9 34.3
France 4   9.50 1.17 13.6 33.9
Australia 3   3.26 0.73 44.2 25.0
Germany 4 12.00 1.33 32.0 32.0
Ireland 2   2.75 1.48 54.0 28.9
Denmark 2   3.25 2.32 77.0 57.1
Finland 3 10.50 1.55 72.6 33.5
Greece 4 11.00 0.36 28.6 13.5
Sweden 5   8.50 3.00 83.6 27.4
Belgium 2 10.50 1.39 52.4 42.3
Luxembourg –– 0.26 ––
Netherlands 4   7.25 1.06 27.9 49.0
New Zealand 3   0.72 0.69 33.6 29.2
Canada 1   1.65 0.56 36.7 28.3
United Kingdom 0   2.25 0.53 46.0 20.2
Portugal 2 12.50 0.73 45.3 24.1
United States 0   0.36 0.20 18.3 12.7
Japan 1   3.71 0.11 25.4   9.8




Strengthen Weaken Weaken Strengthen None
Notes: Union coverage refers to the number of total union members as a percent of wage and salary employment
and is taken from Nickell and Nunziata (2001). The measure of unemployment insurance shown here is the average
gross benefit replacement rate (as a percent of earnings) as defined by the OECD (1994); the figures refer to the
mean replacement rate from 1976–97. The labour standards index, which refers to 1993 standards, is taken from
OECD (1994) and excludes the contributions of minimum wages and employment protection policies to the index.
The employment protection index is taken from OECD (1996) and refers to legislation as of 1989. The active labour
market policies index is taken from OECD (1996) and is measured as public expenditures on public employment
services, labour market training and subsidised employment programs  in fiscal year 1995 as a percent of GDP.The substantial variation in labour market institu-
tions or policies across countries, along with our
evidence that the economic impact of the mini-
mum wage can be importantly influenced by these
other differences in labour markets, suggests that
the effects of the minimum wage on youth
employment could vary significantly across coun-
tries. However, because the policies that charac-
terize a country’s labour market may differ from
those in other countries along a variety of mar-
gins, it is not always straightforward to assess the
implications of a particular set of labour market
policies for the employment effects of the mini-
mum wage. To illustrate the implications of our
results, Table 4 shows the variation in minimum
wage effects for groups of countries differentiated
by the importance of some of the labour market
policies and institutions included in our analysis.
In particular, the countries shown in the table are
grouped into four distinct categories according to
the strictness of their labour standards and the
extent of their use of both employment protection
laws and active labour market policies. Also
shown in each cell is the implied average effect of
the minimum wage on youth employment based
on the specific values for each policy-related
index in the set of countries in that cell and the
associated minimum wage effects taken from the
analysis described above.
Focusing first on the upper left
panel, countries with restrictive
labour standards and generous
levels of employment protection
and active labour market policies
– for example, Germany, Italy
and France – tend to exhibit a
small positive effect of the mini-
mum wage on youth employment
(although in a statistical sense,
the effect is not significantly dif-
ferent from zero). This occurs
because the influence of strict
labour market standards on the
minimum wage effect is out-
weighed by the offsetting effects
of high values for the employ-
ment protection and active
labour market policy indexes.
Indeed, as indicated in the lower
left panel, those countries with
less restrictive labour standards,
but that also have generous levels
of employment protection and
use active labour market policies (Belgium, Portugal
and Denmark) also show a small positive effect of
minimum wages on youth employment (although this
effect is again not significantly different from zero).
In contrast, for the panels on the right-hand side
of the table, which show sets of countries with low
levels of employment protection and less use of
active labour market policies, the minimum wage
effects are negative. For countries with relatively
restrictive labour standards, such as The Nether-
lands, Greece and Australia, the average implied
effect is – 0.19, similar to the average effect we
found for the entire set of countries in our sample.
For countries that have less restrictive labour
standards but that also have low levels of employ-
ment protection and active labour market poli-
cies, the average minimum wage effect on youth
employment is even stronger. One might expect
this group of countries to exhibit a smaller nega-
tive employment effect, as the results in Table 3
indicate that less restrictive labour standards tend
to be associated with weaker minimum wage
effects. As it turns out, however, the countries in
the lower right panel also have even less stringent
employment protection laws and weaker active
labour market policies than the countries in the
upper right panel,which more than offsets the dif-
ference in the labour standards index.
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Table 4
Minimum wage effects differentiated by degree of labour market policies
and institutions





























Note: Implied average effect refers to the percent change in employment
resulting from a one percent increase in the minimum wage.CESifo DICE Report 2/2004 47
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Conclusions
Our results indicate that, on average, minimum
wages tend to reduce employment rates among the
youth population. However, the evidence also sug-
gests that the impact of the minimum wage can dif-
fer noticeably across countries because of other pro-
visions of the minimum wage system or because of
the presence of other labour market policies and
institutions. Perhaps the most striking implication of
our analysis is that the disemployment effects of the
minimum wage are most apparent in those countries
with the least regulated labour markets – namely the
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and
Japan.In contrast,minimum wages seem to have had
little effect in countries with either high levels of
employment protection or where active labour mar-
ket policies are used aggressively.
Of course, some care must be taken in interpreting
these results. They should not be viewed as neces-
sarily providing reliable estimates of the effect of
minimum wages on youth employment in each
country, but rather as providing some indication of
how other labour market policies and institutions
might influence the impact of the minimum wage
on low-skilled labour markets. In this regard, our
study can be viewed as highlighting the importance
of accounting for institutional differences in labour
markets when using data for different countries to
study the effects of economic policies such as the
minimum wage,and from a policy perspective,high-
lighting the danger of blindly applying the estimat-
ed effects of policy changes from one country to
other countries with substantially different sets of
policies and institutions regulating labour markets.
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